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The Texas Construction Trust Fund Act was enacted by the Texas
Legislature in 1967 for the purpose of protection of subcontractors and
materialmen and to ensure that they are paid for their labor and materials
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from funds paid to a contractor! The Act creates a trust relationship,
whereby the contractor is placed in the role of trustee of the funds paid, for
the benefit of the subcontractors and materialmen, who are thereby treated
as the trust beneficiaries.2 The Act currently provides that a "trustee who,
intentionally or knowingly or with intent to defraud, directly or indirectly
retains, uses, disburses, or otherwise diverts trust funds without first fully
paying all current or past due obligations incurred by the trustee to the
beneficiaries of the trust funds, has misapplied the trust funds."3 Such
misapplication by the contractor/trustee constitutes a criminal offense,4 and
has also generally been held to authorize a civil recovery against the
contractor as well.5
The Act contains several affirmative defenses, one of which applies
when "the trust funds not paid to the beneficiaries of the trust were used by
the trustee to pay the trustee's actual expenses directly related to the
construction or repair of the improvement.",6 This affirmative defense is
presumably present because the expenditure of monies directly related to
the construction is seen as qualitatively different-and certainly less
culpable than-the acts of an unscrupulous contractor in absconding with
the trust funds for purely personal purposes or expenses to the detriment of
his subcontractors and materialmen.7
However, since the 1987 amendment, some authorities have provided
that a general contractor's use of trust funds for general overhead would be
sufficient to take advantage of this affirmative defense, and thereby avoid
criminal and civil liability. 8 This precedent of allowance for general
overhead under the affirmative defense was brought to bear in the recent
case of In re Pledger, where it was actually utilized to deny liability for a
'Act of May 29, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 323, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 770, amended by Act
of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, § 4, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2283; Direct Value, L.L.C. v.
Stock Bldg. Supply, L.L.C., 388 S.W.3d 386, 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2012, no pet.).
2 See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001, 162.002, 162.003 (West 2014).
3 1d. § 162.03 1(a).
4 1d. § 162.032. The offense is a Class A misdemeanor if basic misapplication of funds of
$500 or more is committed. Id§ 162.032(a). It is a third-degree felony if the misapplication is
committed with intent to defraud. Id. § 162.032(b).
5Dealers Elec. Supply Co. v. Scoggins Constr. Co., 292 S.W.3d 650, 657 (Tex. 2009) (citing
C & G, Inc. v. Jones, 165 S.W.3d 450, 453 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied)).
6 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.03 1(b) (emphasis added).
7Dealers Elec., 292 S.W.3d at 659.
8 See infra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
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contractor who had used trust funds on his own general business overhead. 9
In following existing precedent, the bankruptcy court in Pledger stated:
"This interpretation of the statute is troubling to the Court .... Under such
a standard it becomes difficult to determine what constitutes a violation of
the statute. Indeed, under this approach, the affirmative defense appears to
swallow the statute itself."10 The problem, of course, is that all general
contractors will nearly always have substantial overhead, and if allowed to
spend trust funds on such overhead without liability, the trust protection for
subcontractors and materialmen afforded by the Trust Fund Act will have
almost zero effect." Nevertheless, the court in Pledger felt constrained to
follow the apparent existing precedent allowing overhead expenditures to
suffice for the "directly related" affirmative defense. 1
2
The bankruptcy court in Pledger was right to be troubled. Applying the
"direct expenses" affirmative defense to obtain this result is contrary to the
spirit of the Trust Fund Act, its actual text, and its purposes. It results from
a nearly nonsensical interpretation of the text of the current statute, and in
so doing does great harm to the very parties-subcontractors and
materialmen-that it is primarily designed to protect. And, it almost
certainly is a misinterpretation of the original intent of the current form of
the statute, as amended in 1987.
In fact, a review of the history of the Trust Fund Act-and, specifically,
the "direct expenses" defense-will, the author believes, reveal that
overhead expenses were not contemplated to be allowed to suffice for
satisfaction of the affirmative defense under the present statute. That there
is now precedent for such a result is a consequence of a series of
misunderstandings in the cases, the legislative history, and apparent
political pressure. This article seeks to rectify the misunderstanding and
incorrect precedent and clarify that overhead expenses should not be
sufficient to satisfy the affirmative defense. When the history of the statute
is fully revealed-along with the concomitant legislative history- the error
of the precedent for overhead allowance should be apparent. Further, even
absent any misunderstanding, to allow overhead is contrary to the policy
9See No. 12-6005-CAG, 2013 WL 796626, *5 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013), aft'd, 2015 WL
294829 (5th Cir. 2015). The case was actually decided in a bankruptcy context, and the issue
before the bankruptcy court was the dischargeability of the contractor's debt under § 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Id. at *1.
"'Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
" See id.
2See id.
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behind the Trust Fund Act, and contractors should not be allowed to evade
liability by spending trust funds on general overhead before first paying all
beneficiaries with the contract funds with which they have been entrusted.
Part I of this Article will discuss the origins of the Trust Fund Act,
including the draft versions leading up to its original enactment in 1967, as
well as cases decided under this original version of the Act. Part II will
discuss the 1987 amendments to the Act, as well as an oft-cited 1988
Attorney General Opinion issued shortly after the amendments; this part
will also discuss the cases decided since the 1987 amendments. Part III will
illustrate the error that has resulted in interpreting the affirmative defense,
based on the plain meaning, the full legislative history, and the policy
reasons for the statute. Part IV will present a conclusion.
I. THE 1967 ORIGINAL ENACTMENT OF THE TRUST FUND ACT, ITS
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND CASES DECIDED THEREUNDER
A. The Enactment of the Trust Fund Act and Its History
The original enactment of the Construction Trust Fund Act occurred in
1967, during the 60th Regular Session of the Texas Legislature. 13 It was
enacted by House Bill 42, and stated in its introduction that it was an Act
"declaring construction payments and loan receipts to be trust funds; [and]
defining wrongful disbursement and misapplication of trust funds as a
misdemeanor and attaching a penalty."'14 The available legislative materials
indicate that the need for the new law was that "[u]nder present law, there is
no guarantee that funds paid to a contractor under a construction contract
for the improvement of specific real property will be used only for the said
construction project." 5
In order to accomplish this end, Section 1 of House Bill 42 originally
defined construction trust funds as follows:
13Act of May 29, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 323, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 770, amended by Act
of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, § 4, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2283.
14Id. (original bill). The bill's author was Joshua M. "Red" Simpson, and its coauthors were
Willis James Whatley, John Traeger, Thomas Hutcheson "Tom" Bass, III, and J. Hudson Moyer.
Id.
15 House Comm. Substitute, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 42, 60th Leg., R.S. (1967), available at
http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/LASDOCS/60R/HB42/HB4260R.pdf. The filing of traditional
mechanics' and materialmen's laws is another potential avenue of recovery for such
subcontractors, artisans and materialmen. See TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.021 (West 2014).
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Section 1. CONSTRUCTION PAYMENTS AND LOAN
RECEIPTS DECLARED TRUST FUNDS. All moneys or
funds paid to a contractor or any officer, director or agent
thereof, under a construction contract for the improvement
of specific real property in this state, and all funds
borrowed by a contractor, subcontractor, owner, or any
officer, director or agent thereof, for the purpose of
improving such real property which are secured in whole or
in part by a lien on the specific property to be improved are
hereby declared to be Trust Funds for the benefit of the
artisans, laborers, mechanics, subcontractors or
materialmen who may labor or furnish labor or material for
the construction or repair of any house, building or
improvement whatever upon such real property and the
contractor, subcontractor, owner, or any officer, director or
agent thereof, receiving such payments or funds, or having
control or direction of same, is hereby made and constituted
a Trustee of such funds so received or under his control or
direction. 
16
Section 2 of the bill then defined the wrongful misapplication of such trust
funds by the contractor or other recipient:
Sec. 2. WRONGFUL DISBURSEMENT, USE OR
RETENTION OF TRUST FUNDS. Any Trustee, who
shall, directly or indirectly, with intent to defraud, retain,
use, disburse, misapply, or otherwise divert, any trust
funds, or part thereof, as defined in Section 1 of this Act,
without first fully paying and satisfying all obligations of
the Trustee to all artisans, laborers, mechanics,
subcontractors, or materialmen, incurred or to be incurred
in connection with the construction and improvements, for
which said funds were received, shall be deemed to have
misapplied said Trust Funds... 17
It is noteworthy that, in the bill's original inception, there was no allowance
for the Trustee's overhead expenses (or any other expenses, for that matter)
16Act of May 29, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 323, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 770, amended by Act
of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, § 4, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2283.
'
71d.
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to be paid from the Trust Funds-rather, the obligations owed to the
"beneficiaries" (i.e., subcontractors, artisans and materialmen) were
absolutely required to be paid first before the Trustee could use the Trust
Funds for any other purpose.1 8
This absolute protection, however, was short-lived. The bill was debated
initially in the House Judiciary Committee, and the committee first
proposed a change to the bill in the form of Committee Amendment No. 1,
which amended Section 1, defining Trust Funds, in the following manner
(changes/additions noted by underline or strikethrough):
COMMITTEE AMENDMENT NO. 1
Section 1. CONSTRUCTION PAYMENTS AND LOAN
RECEIPTS DECLARED TRUST FUNDS. All moneys or
funds paid to a contractor or subcontractor or any officer,
director or agent thereof, under a construction contract for
the improvement of specific real property in this state, and
all funds borrowed by a contractor, subcontractor, owner,
or any officer, director or agent thereof, for the purpose of
improving such real property which are secured in whole or
in part by a lien on the specific property to be improved are
hereby declared to be Trust Funds for the benefit of the
artisans, laborers, mechanics, contractors, subcontractors or
materialmen who may labor or furnish labor or material for
the construction or repair of any house, building or
improvement whatever upon such real property; provided,
however, that up to and no more than 20% of said monies
paid to a contractor or subcontractor or borrowed by a
contractor, subcontractor or owner may be used to pay
reasonable overhead and operating expenses of said
contractor, subcontractor or owner. and- he The contractor,
subcontractor, owner, or any officer, director or agent
thereof, receiving such payments or funds, or having
control or direction of same, is hereby made and constituted
a Trustee of such funds so received or under his control or
direction.19
"See id.
19Act of May 27, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 323, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 770 (Committee
Amendment No. 1) (emphasis added).
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The primary impact of Committee Amendment No. 1 was to allow the
Trustee (often the general contractor) to use up to 20% of the Trust Funds,
not for the payment of direct obligations owed to laborers, subcontractors
and other artisans, but rather for payment of the Trustee's general overhead
or expenses.20 As the legislative analysis materials indicate: "There [under
this version of the bill] is a 20% allowable to be used for reasonable
overhead and expenses of operating before the provisions of this act are to
be brought to bear. 'z1 This was a direct detriment to the beneficiaries of the
Trust, and served only to benefit the Trustee-who was, most of the time,
the general contractor.2 Legislative materials from the 1967 session are
sparse, but almost certainly this change to the bill was the result of lobbying
by the general contractor/builder industry.23
The changes to the bill, however, did not stop there.24 Before leaving the
House Judiciary Committee, Section 1 of HB 42 was changed one more
time, by a second committee amendment (changes/additions noted by
underline or strikethrough):
COMMITTEE AMENDMENT NO. 2
Section 1. CONSTRUCTION PAYMENTS AND LOAN
RECEIPTS DECLARED TRUST FUNDS. All moneys or
funds paid to a contractor or subcontractor or any officer,
director or agent thereof, under a construction contract for
the improvement of specific real property in this state, and
all funds borrowed by a contractor, subcontractor, owner,
or any officer, director or agent thereof, for the purpose of
improving such real property which are secured in whole or
in part by a lien on the specific property to be improved are
hereby declared to be Trust Funds for the benefit of the
artisans, laborers, mechanics, contractors, subcontractors or
materialmen who may labor or furnish labor or material for
the construction or repair of any house, building or
20 See id.
2 1 Analysis of Committee Substitute, H.R. 42, 1967 Sess. (Tex. 1967), http://www.Irl.state.tx.
us/LASDOCS/60R/HB42/HB42_60R.pdf.
22 See id.
23 The advocacy of such groups will be plain in reviewing the legislative history of the 1987
legislation. See infra Part III.B.
24 See Act of May 27, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 323, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 770 (Committee
Amendment No. 2).
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improvement whatever upon such real property; provided,
however, that up to and no ... r than 20 of said menics
moneys paid to a contractor or subcontractor or borrowed
by a contractor, subcontractor or owner may be used to pay
reasonable overhead and operating pnsc of said
contractor, subcontractor or owner, directly related to such
construction contract. The contractor, subcontractor, owner,
or any officer, director or agent thereof, receiving such
payments or funds, or having control or direction of same,
is hereby made and constituted a Trustee of such funds so
received or under his control or direction.25
There are no readily available indicators of the legislative intent of this
subsequent amendment. However, it makes at least three changes to Section
1 of the Bill. First (and perhaps most importantly), it completely eliminated
the 20% limitation on the Trustee's use of the Trust Funds to pay his own
overhead rather than using it to pay the beneficiaries (for whom it was
originally intended), such as subcontractors, laborers and artisans.26 Under
this amendment, Trustees were allowed to spend the entirety of the received
Trust Funds for their own overhead expenses, rather than forward a single
dime to the intended beneficiaries of such Trust-again, the subcontractors,
laborers and artisans who performed work on the project.27 Second, it
eliminated the ability of the Trustee to spend the Trust Funds on "operating
expenses," but rather limited the allowance to "reasonable overhead.,
28
Third, it added a purported limitation (an odd one, as will be seen), that the
overhead spent must be "directly related" to the construction contract at
issue.29
It is quite arguable that this final amendment to House Bill 42 did great
damage to the original purposes behind the bill and eviscerated its effect in
advancing the original policy. The original animating concern of the bill
was to give protection to the subcontractors and laborers who relied on the
contractor to pay them from the funds received from the owner (or loan or
25 1d. (emphasis added).
26See id.
27 See id.
281d.
291d.
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other source). 30 By allowing the entirety of the Trust Funds to be used
instead for the Trustee's own overhead, it became possible for the
beneficiaries to actually receive nothing whatsoever from the Trust Funds.31
The other changes in the final amendment-that "operating expenses"
could not be paid from Trust Funds, and that any expenditure could only be
on overhead "directly related" to the construction contract at issue-have
the feel of attempts at legislative compromise, but in reality make little
sense in the overall context of the final bill as amended.32 For one thing, the
disallowance of payment for "operating expenses" adds little, as a great
proportion of the contractor's expenses qualify as "overhead" and are thus
subsumed within the allowance of the provision.33 Moreover, the additional
requirement that the reasonable overhead paid from Trust Funds be
"directly related" to the construction contract is puzzling. According to
Black's Law Dictionary, "overhead" is defined as "business expenses (such
as rent, utilities, or support-staff salaries) that cannot be allocated to a
particular product or service; fixed or ordinary operating costs. Also termed
administrative expense; office expense.'3 4 Thus, the allowance of
"overhead" (defined as not allocated to a particular contract or service) that
is "directly related' to a particular contract, would appear to be largely self-
contradictory.35 Overhead, by definition, is generally not related to any one
particular product or service.36 Nevertheless, Section 1 of House Bill 42 did
not change further from this final language, and it was enacted into law at
the end of the session and became Texas law.37 It would appear that the
original bill, intended to provide great benefit and protection for the
beneficiaries/subcontractors, was drastically altered to instead provide a
large measure of protection and cover for the general contractor/builder
industry.
30Act of May 29, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 323, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 770, amended by Act
of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, § 4, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2283.
31 See Act of May 27, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 323, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 770 (Committee
Amendment No. 2).
32 See id.
33See id.
34 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (10th ed. 2009).
35See id.
36 See id.
37 Act of May 27, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 323, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 770 (amended 1987)
(current version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.031 (West 2014)).
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The Trust Fund Statute, as it came to be called, was first set forth in
Article 5472e of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes. 38 Later, in 1983 as part
of the general codification process of Texas law, it was re-organized as
Chapter 162 of the newly-enacted Texas Property Code.39  As
nonsubstantively re-enacted, Section 162.001 contained the provisions
defining construction payments as trust funds.40 Section 162.002 provided
the same definition of the Trustee of the trust funds.41 Section 162.003
provided the same basic definition of the beneficiaries of such trust funds-
the statute still provided that a beneficiary was an "artist, laborer, mechanic,
contractor, subcontractor, or materialman who labors or who furnishes labor
or material" for the construction or repair of real property.42 At that time,
Section 162.031 provided the misapplication rule and the "reasonable
overhead" exception as follows:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a trustee who,
with intent to defraud, directly or indirectly retains, uses,
disburses, or otherwise diverts trust funds without first fully
paying all obligations incurred by the trustee to the
beneficiaries of the trust funds has misapplied the trust
funds.
(b) A trustee may use trust funds to pay the trustee's
reasonable overhead expenses that are directly related to
the construction or repair of the improvement.43
B. Cases Decided Under the Original Trust Fund Act and Its
"Reasonable Overhead" Exception
Early on, the cases dealing with the newly-enacted statute noted
generally that it supplemented the existing mechanic's lien statutes, and
also that the statute should be broadly and liberally construed so as to
accomplish its intended purposes-namely, the protection of the
beneficiaries named in the statute so as to allow them to be paid to the
38]d
39Act of May 24, 1983 68th Leg., R.S. ch 576, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 3477.
40TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.001 (West 2014).
411d. § 162.002.
42 1d. § 162.003.
431d. § 162.03 1.
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fullest extent possible.an Beyond this, however, not many significant
decisions were reported that dealt in some way with the overhead exception
until 1982 when the Northern District of Texas issued North Texas
Operating Engineers Health Benefit Fund v. Dixie Masonry, Inc.45
In Dixie Masonry, a dispute arose between an employee benefit fund
and the officer of a contractor company which was contractually required to
fund the employee benefit plan with a stipulated amount for each hour
worked by the employees on various construction jobs.46 There was no
question that the company owed the employee benefit contributions-the
litigated issue was the applicability of the trust fund statute to an individual
officer of the company.47 There were two specific construction jobs for
which the company had failed to contribute to the benefit plan.48 The
company incurred a loss on each of them, and rather than paying the benefit
contributions on behalf of the employees, it paid other expenses, including
its "general administration expenses" which were not directly traceable to
any particular project-in other words, general overhead.4 9
The court noted, under the statutory exception, that the "central issue in
this action is what constitutes 'reasonable overhead ... directly related to
[a] construction contract."' 5 The court further noted the following:
As used in the statute, "overhead" is a broad term. As
generally understood in the field of accounting, overhead
broadly includes the continuous expenses of a business,
without regard to the outlay on a particular contract....
The principal dispute is over whether defendants have
shown that the general administration expense is overhead
directly related to each of the jobs [as required by the
statute]
44For an early case, see Owens v. Drywall & Acoustical Supply Corp., 325 F. Supp. 397, 400
(S.D. Tex. 1971) (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5160 (West 1971) and art. 5452 et seq.
(West 1958 & Supp.1970)).
45544 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
461d. at 517.
47 1d. The company involved, Dixie Masonry, admitted liability under the statute. Id.
41Id. at 517-19.
491d. at 518.
5 Id. at 519.
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The [plaintiffs'] argument rests [on the point] that there
was insufficient evidence presented to show that the
general administrative expenses claimed by Dixie Masonry
were directly related to the specific construction contracts.
Implicit in this argument is the contention that the fixed
costs which are included in the general administrative
expense can never be directly related to a particular
construction contract.
51
The court, however, ultimately rejected the plaintiffs arguments.52 The
court-faced with reconciling the odd use by Article 5472e of the terms
"overhead" (which usually means general costs not tied to a particular
project) together with the "directly related" proviso (which is at odds with
the idea of general overhead)-noted the well-known principle of statutory
construction that "every word in a statute is presumed to have been used
intentionally and in the sense in which it is commonly understood, and
when a word has a settled meaning or legal significance, it is presumed to
have been used in that sense."53 Thus, the court was determined to have the
exception make sense if at all possible.
As a result, the court resolved the issue by giving a particular meaning
to "directly related overhead" that reconciled the use of these two
seemingly contradictory terms: "The expenses that cannot readily be traced
to a particular project are nonetheless 'directly related' if the job could not
have been obtained or completed without them. 54 As to the general
administrative expenses at issue, the court had already found that they
included overhead in the purest sense-general "office" expenses necessary
for running the business (i.e., salaries and utilities expenses).55 Presumably,
therefore, the court decided that essentially all overhead was "directly
related. 5 6 In other words, without paying rent to have an office, or without
paying the phone bill monthly, etc., the contractor could not continue in
business and do the various projects, and therefore paying these general
511d. at 519 (emphasis added) (citing Vitex Mfg. Corp. v. Caribtex Corp., 377 F.2d 795, 798
(3d Cir. 1967); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (4th ed. 1951); THE RANDOM HOUSE
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1027 (1969)).
52See id. at 519-20.
531d. at 520 (citing Turullols v. San Felipe Country Club, 458 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1970, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
54 Id. (emphasis added).
551d. at 518.
56See id at 520.
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overhead expenses was thus "directly related" (in a sense) to the specific
projects.57 Lest this be seen as an exaggeration of the court's position, it
later stated: "the Court has ... determined that the 'directly related'
requirement does not mandate that the expenses necessarily be traceable to
a particular project.58 Indeed, in Dixie Masonry no such attempt to trace
them was done-the general administrative expenses were allocated to the
particular projects solely by a ratio consisting of the project billings divided
by the total billings for the same period.59 It appears the court sanctioned
this method as satisfactory for the requirement that the overhead be
"reasonable," as the court stated "the requirement that payments for
overhead be reasonable ... acts as a limitation on overhead expenses
allocated to a particular construction contract., 60 The plaintiffs argued that
such a methodology was inappropriate since it did not show a direct tie-in
to the projects at issue, but as noted the court ruled that no such tracing
need be shown.61 It is difficult to imagine what overhead expenses the court
in Dixie Masonry would have decided-given its rationale-was not
"directly related."
The next significant case to deal with the "reasonable overhead"
provision was a criminal case, McElroy v. State.62 McElroy involved a
contractor who was convicted of misapplication of trust funds.63 One of the
issues involved was the applicability and nature of the reasonable overhead
provision. 4 The court held that the provision was an exception, rather than
a defense, and that the prosecutor thus bore the burden of disproving that
the trust funds were spent on "reasonable overhead." 65 The court
accordingly reversed the conviction, citing Dixie Masonry and observing
that "[t]he State did not prove that the appellant allocated his overhead
expenses in an unreasonable manner., 66 Of note was a concurring opinion,
"7See idat 518, 520.
58Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
59Id. at 518.
6 1Id. at 518-19.
6 1Id. at 520.
62667 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1984, pet. granted), aff'd, 720 S.W.2d 490, 495 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1986).
631d.
64Id. at 864.
651d. at 864-65.
66Id. at 865 (citing North Texas Operating Eng'rs v. Dixie Masonry, 544 F. Supp. 516, 519-
20 (N.D. Tex. 1982)).
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which reversed the conviction on the alternative basis that the provision
excepting "reasonable overhead directly related to such construction
contract" was unconstitutionally vague because "it fails to delineate the
extent to which payment can be made of ongoing business costs apart from
particular overhead incurred on a given job. 67 Of particular concern to the
concurring justice was use of the adjective "reasonable"-the court was
concerned the term was too uncertain for a criminal statute, and that, as a
result, a trustee contractor "must guess as to what the statute means when it
refers to 'reasonable overhead. . . directly related' to the contract., 68 The
justice further explained that "the statute is not drafted with sufficient
clarity to enable an individual to understand exactly what conduct is
proscribed and is so vague, indefinite, and uncertain as to be incapable of
being understood., 69 Although the majority did not agree that the provision
was unconstitutionally vague, this possibility would later be cited as one of
the reasons for amending the statute.70
The last significant case to be decided before the 1987 amendments to
the Act was In re Boyle.71 Boyle was a bankruptcy decision, in which the
primary issue was the dischargeability in bankruptcy of the debts owed by a
contractor to a supplier, specifically by way of argument that a
misapplication of trust funds under the Texas Act constituted a breach or
defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, under Section 523(a)(4) of
the Bankruptcy Code. 2 The opinion ultimately concluded that a violation of
the Trust Funds Act does not necessarily constitute a violation of Section
523(a)(4).73 Moreover, the "reasonable overhead" provision of the Act was
not discussed directly in the opinion. However, in discussing the
requirements of the Act, the Court made some observations that would later
be cited by subsequent Texas courts as authorization:
The statute contains no provision requiring the fund holder
to segregate funds by source and project; it does not
671d. at 868.
6 1d. at 869.
691d
70See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
71 819 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1987).
721d. at 583. Section 523(a)(4) provides that a "discharge under [various sections] of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt.., for fraud or defalcation while acting in
a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny ... " Id. at 587 n.8 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)
(2012)).
731d. at 592-93.
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prohibit the commingling of funds; it does not bar use of
funds provided for one project to pay bills incurred on
another project if this is done without an "intent to
defraud"; and it does not prohibit a fund holder from
paying, without any fraudulent intent, creditors on one
project with surplus funds left over from earlier work and
then using the funds provided for that later project on still
other work. In short, the statute does not create "red,"
"blue," and "yellow" dollars each of which can only be
used for the "red," "blue," or "yellow" construction
project.74
Of course, the court was assuming in its hypothetical that the "intent to
defraud" culpability was missing75 -if "red" dollars were spent on the
"blue" project with intent to defraud while "red" creditors remained unpaid,
the Act in its present form would have been violated. 6 Also notably, "intent
to defraud" was not then defined in the Act.77 And further, the Court is not
discussing the "reasonable overhead" provision in its opinion, at all. These
caveats should be borne in mind when looking at subsequent cases citing
Boyle.
II. THE 1987 AMENDMENTS, ATTORNEY GENERAL OP. JM-945, AND
CASES DECIDED THEREUNDER
In 1987, the 70th Texas Legislature passed several amendments to the
Trust Fund Act, including specifically the provision providing for an
exception for reasonable overhead expenditures.78 Shortly afterward, an
Attorney General Opinion was issued regarding the amendments, and
thereafter cases following the Opinion were decided, most of which
ultimately had the effect of reiterating the continuation of precedent for the
allowance of general overhead.79 And this, notwithstanding the very
significant textual change to the Trust Fund Act.80 A discussion of the
amendments, the AG Opinion, and the cases construing them follows.
74Id. at 586.
75 1d.
76 Act of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2283.
771d.
7 8Act of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2283.
79 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988).
8°Act of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2283.
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A. The 1987 Amendments: Creation of the "Actual Expenses"
Affirmative Defense
House Bill 1160 was introduced into the Texas House of
Representatives during the 1987 legislative session.81 It made several
changes to Chapter 162 of the Property Code,82 but significantly for
purposes of this article it dramatically modified the "reasonable overhead"
provision, by amending Section 162.031 in part as follows (changes/
additions noted by underline or strikethrough):
Sec. 162.031. MISAPPLICATION OF TRUST FUNDS. (a)
A Except as provid d by Subscc.i. n (b), a trustee who,
intentionally or knowingly or with intent to defraud,
directly or indirectly retains, use, disburses, or otherwise
diverts trust funds without first fully paying all current or
past due obligations incurred by the trustee to the
beneficiaries of the trust funds. has misapplied the trust
funds.
(b) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution or other
action brought under Subsection (a) that the trust funds not
paid to the beneficiaries of the trust were used by the
trustee to pay the trustee's actual expenses directly related
to the construction or repair of the improvement .... A
..... ead ........ that are directy related to the
81id.
82The first version of the bill proposed to eliminate the "intent to defraud" requirement, but
this was later abandoned, and instead a definition of "intent to defraud" was added, along with an
expansion of possible culpabilities to include "intentional or knowing." Id.
83Id. (emphasis added). The bill added definitions to two terms in Section 162.031 (a). "Intent
to defraud" was defined in the bill as follows: "A trustee acts with 'intent to defraud' when he
retains, uses, disburses, or diverts trust funds with the intent to deprive the beneficiaries of the
trust funds." (to be provided in newly added Section 162.005(1)). "Current or past due
obligations" was defined in the bill as follows:
'Current or past due obligations' are those incurred or owed by the trustee for labor or
materials furnished in the direct prosecution of the work under the construction contract
prior to the receipt of the trust funds and which are due and payable by the trustee no
later than 30 days following receipt of the trust funds.
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These amendments were apparently enacted in large part as a reaction to
both the difficulty in prosecution of the statute, as well as the concern
(raised in the concurrence in McElroy v. State) that the "reasonable
overhead" provision may be unconstitutionally vague.84 One way that the
bill served to ease the burden of prosecution was to add two additional
levels of culpability beyond the high level "intent to defraud"-to this was
added the ability to show the misapplication was committed "intentionally"
or even simply "knowingly.
85
The other change to Section 162.031 which is significant for purposes of
this article was the complete elimination of the former "reasonable
overhead" exception and its re-codification as an "actual expenses"
affirmative defense.86 The enforcement import of recharacterizing the
provision as an affirmative defense was to shift the burden of proof on the
issue to the defense, rather than making the prosecution or plaintiff disprove
the issue.87
Beyond the procedural modification of recharacterizing the provision as
an affirmative defense, however, the bill substantively deleted the phrase
"reasonable overhead" from the statute altogether.88 In its place, the bill
provided that in order to prove the affirmative defense and thereby
eliminate liability for misapplication of trust funds by paying anyone other
Id. (to be provided in newly added Section 162.005(2)). Moreover, in addition to the "actual
expenses" affirmative defense set forth above, the bill added two more affirmative defenses to the
statute. The first affirmative defense requires:
trust funds not paid to the beneficiaries of the trust... have been retained by the
trustee, after notice to the beneficiary who has made a request for payment, as a result
of the trustee's reasonable belief that the beneficiary is not entitled to such funds or
have been retained as authorized or required by Chapter.
Id. (to be provided in newly added Section 162.031 (b)). Second, the bill provides:
[i]t is also an affirmative defense to prosecution or other action brought under
Subsection (a) that the trustee paid the beneficiaries all trust funds which they are
entitled to receive no later than 30 days following written notice to the trustee of the
filing of a criminal complaint or other notice of a pending criminal investigation.
Id. (to be provided in newly added Section 162.031 (c)).
84House Comm. on Judicial Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 1160, 70th Leg., R.S. (1987),
available at http://www.lrl.state.tx.us/LASDOCS/70R/HB 1160/HB 1160 70R.pdf.
85Act of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2283.
86See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.04 (West 2011).
87 See id.
88Act of June 1, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 2283.
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than the beneficiaries, the trustee was required to show that it paid "the
trustee's actual expenses directly related to the construction or repair of the
improvement. ''89 This, in fact, remains the current language of the statute to
the present day. 90 With the overt deletion of "reasonable overhead," and
substitution of the phrase "actual expenses directly related," one would
have thought that the matter was clear-the former statute's provision for
excepting overhead expenditures from liability under the Act (and followed
in cases like Dixie Masonry) was legislatively overruled, and henceforth the
trustee would have to prove the trust funds were paid for direct, traceable
expenses on or attributed to the job site itself in order to avail itself of the
affirmative defense. But, it turns out, things were apparently not to be so
simple.
B. Attorney General Opinion No. JM-945
Shortly after the enactment of House Bill 1160, Senator John Montford,
Chair of the State Affairs Committee, forwarded a list of seven questions to
then-Attorney General Jim Mattox, the subject of which was "Interpretation
of 1987 amendments to chapter 162 of the Property Code regarding
construction funds or trust funds." 91 On August 24, 1988, the Attorney
General formally responded by issuing Opinion No. JM-945.92 In his
introduction, Attorney General Mattox noted that House Bill 1160 "made
various provisions for the protection of subcontractors and other
beneficiaries of funds paid or held under construction contracts," and that
Chapter 162, as amended by House Bill No. 1160, provides
that construction payments or loan receipts held for the
purpose of paying for improvements of real property, are
"trust funds" which may not be used or diverted by the
holder until those who have furnished labor or materials
have been paid.93
The second question (relevant for current purposes) asked by Senator
Montford was: "Do 'expenses directly related to the construction or repair
of the improvement' under Section 162.03 1(b), Property Code, include the
89Id. (emphasis added).
'°TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.03 1(b) (West 2014).
9 1Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988).
921d
93 id
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trustee's overhead and other expenses which, though not readily traceable
to a particular job, are necessary to obtaining or completing the job (e.g.,
office rent, employee salaries, workers' compensation insurance, liability
insurance, communications bill, etc.)?, 94 It is quite notable that Senator
Montford used the exact phrasing from the Dixie Masonry case, which had
authorized general overhead under the prior version of the statute (which
expressly mentioned overhead). 95 The question, phrased thusly, is certainly
consistent with an attempt to secure an interpretation from the Attorney
General which continued to favor builders and general contractors, at the
expense of subcontractors, materialmen and laborers.
In responding, the AG Opinion first noted that the statute had previously
provided explicitly for overhead, but that the newly-revised version of the
statute no longer continued this language-instead using the phrase "actual
expenses directly related. .. The Opinion further reiterated that the
animating concern behind the amendment was apparently prior difficulty in
obtaining successful prosecutions under the statute.97 Nevertheless, the
Opinion emphasized that the phrase "directly related" had not changed with
the revision, and cited the Dixie Masonry case for the proposition that "[t]he
expenses that cannot readily be traced to a particular project are nonetheless
'directly related' if the job could not have been obtained or completed
without them." 98 In citing Dixie Masonry, a pre-amendment case, the
Opinion made no effort to state why the change from "overhead" to "actual
expenses" in the statute should not have made a difference. 99
The other basis for what would be the Attorney General's answer to the
question was some discussion from the legislative debate regarding House
Bill 1160:
Representative Robnett:
Do you intend that it is o.k. for a builder to pay his
superintendent, secretary, computer, pick-up truck, office
or any administrative expenses and other similar expenses
related to the construction of a home out of these trust
funds?
94 1d. (emphasis added).
95544 F. Supp. 516, 520 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
96 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988).
97
1d.
98 1d. (citing Dixie Masonry, 544 F. Supp. at 520).
99 d.
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Representative Parker:
I think, yes, I certainly do and I [want to] direct your
attention, Buzz -- I think it's important-to that 'directly
related' now. I think there has to be a-maybe you might
need to ask a 'but for' question. And 'but for' the
construction would I need to spend this money. And if it's
related to construction, I think it's exempted. I do not think
it presents a problem.
Mr. Johansen [Executive Vice President of Texas
Association of Builders]:
[W]hen you have a multiplicity of loans and a multiplicity
of houses under construction it's almost impossible to track
that money through and to prove that X draw was paid on
X house when you have other on-going expenses and
overhead--overhead items that you need to pay.
Senator Parker:
[Builders got in trouble under the old law] because they
refused to keep decent records. . . what is so difficult about
[it]. It ought not to be that hard to figure out some
proportion of your overhead-total overhead that goes to
per day, per month, per man hour worked. 10
Based on the cited legislative debate excerpts, and also based on the citation
of Dixie Masonry (a pre-1987 amendment case), the Attorney General
responded to Senator Montford's second question as follows:
In light of the foregoing, we conclude, in response to your
second question, that the words of section 162.03 1, 'actual
expenses directly related to the construction or repair of the
improvement,' include overhead and other expenses which,
though not readily traceable to a particular job, are
necessary to obtaining or completing the job, so long as the
expenses are 'actual,' i.e., have in fact been incurred.10'
In other words, notwithstanding the significant changes to the statute by the
overt deletion of the word "overhead" from the statute, the Attorney
10 Id.101Id. (emphasis added).
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General Opinion nevertheless opined that the exact same result obtained
under the new version of the statute as under the old. 10 2 Overhead could be
paid from trust funds, even if not tied to any particular construction
project-resulting in subcontractors and other beneficiaries not getting
paid.'0 3 Under the Opinion, contractors were essentially treated no
differently in this respect, than they had been under the pre-1987 version of
the Act when overhead was explicitly authorized, to the potential detriment
of subcontractors and other beneficiaries. 1
04
C. Cases Decided Under the 1987 Amendments and AG Opinion
Within four years after the issuance of AG Opinion No. JM-945, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in In re
Nicholas.10 5 Nicholas involved the bankruptcy proceeding of an individual
who owned a general contractor, and the objection to dischargeability of
debts owed by the contractor to a plumbing subcontractor. 10 6 At issue was
whether or not the contractor had violated the newly amended Property
Code Section 162.031, and if so whether such violation was sufficient to
trigger the dischargeability exception of section 523(a)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Code. 10 7 The contractor argued that no violation of the Trust
Fund Act occurred, because he had satisfied the "actual expenses directly
related" affirmative defense-further, the expenditures on which this
argument were based were clearly general overhead:
[W]hile the evidence was "rather sketchy on exactly what
happened to the money that was received [by the
contractor]," all of the money from the projects went into
the operation of [the contractor's] business. The [lower]
court also found that there was no evidence that the funds
received from the owners of the project were used for any
purpose other than to pay bills of the corporation.' °8
102 See id.
13id.
104id.
105956 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1992).
"
61d. at 110-11.
1
°
71d. at 111.
108Id.
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The Fifth Circuit, affirming the decision that the contractor had not violated
the Trust Fund Act by virtue of the overhead payments, noted that the 1987
version of the statute appeared to permit such payments, observing that the
affirmative defense was "open-ended" and allowed payment of actual
expenses to those other than beneficiaries. 0 9 In so doing, the Fifth Circuit
cited and directly relied on Opinion No. JM-945, as well as In re Boyle (a
pre-1987 Fifth Circuit opinion).110 Relying on these authorities, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the contractor's
actions in paying general overhead satisfied the affirmative defense-by
simply using these trust funds and paying them "into the operation of his
business ... [i.e., using it] to pay bills in the corporation" was sufficient to
evade liability, even though the subcontractors remained unpaid. 11 Thus,
the AG Opinion No. JM-945 (coupled with Boyle) was cited and relied on
by the Fifth Circuit in construing the post-1987 amendments to section
162.031, and the die for establishing this as precedent had been further
cast. 
112
Although In re Nicholas was a federal opinion deciding issues of state
law, its conclusion was subsequently cited and adopted by a Texas Court of
Appeals in Lively v. Carpet Services, Inc.' 13 In Lively, a subcontractor sued
the sole shareholder and officer of a bankrupt general contractor, claiming
that the officer had misapplied trust funds received from the owner by not
paying the subcontractor the amount owed. 114 The trial court granted
summary judgment for the subcontractor under the Trust Fund Act. 115
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment and
remanded for trial, based on finding that the officer had raised a fact issue
on the affirmative defense-specifically, the officer's summary judgment
evidence provided that the trust funds had been spent on "actual expenses
09Id. at 113.
"ld. (citing Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988); In re Boyle, 819 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.
1987)). It is true that the court relied on Boyle in large part because it was also directly relevant
precedent to the federal question of the dischargeability of the debt under § 523(a)(4) of the
Bankruptcy Code. However, Nicholas also seemed to rely on Boyle as precedent for construing
the Texas statute as well: "What Boyle said still almost precisely describes the Texas statute:
'... the statute does not create "red," "blue," and "yellow" dollars each of which can only be used
for the "red," "blue," or "yellow" construction project."' Id. (citing Boyle, 819 F.2d at 586).
ilNicholas, 956 F.2d. at 114.
1121d at 113.
"'904 S.W.2d 868, 876 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
1141d. at 870.
1
5Id.
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directly related to the construction and office overhead. . . 16 The Lively
court, citing Boyle, Nicholas, and Op. No. JM-945, stated that this was
sufficient to prove the affirmative defense:
Although neither party has cited any Texas cases, the
Federal courts that have addressed this issue have
concluded that the Act does not prohibit the use of
construction trust funds for overhead and other "directly
related" expenses. In an advisory opinion, the Texas
Attorney General has concluded that the affirmative
defense allows a contractor to pay funds out for overhead
and other expenses, even if they are not readily traceable,
as long as they were actually incurred." 7
Lively therefore further relied on these cases, and the Attorney General
Opinion, in agreeing that overhead remained sufficient under section
162.031(b). 1 8 Subsequent cases over the next 15 years continued to cite
these authorities for the same basic proposition that general overhead was
sufficient to prove the affirmative defense, including as recently as 2013.119
161d. at 876 (emphasis added).
1 71d. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
18 See id.
119See, e.g., Holladay v. C.W. & A, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 243, 248 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
2001, pet. denied) (citing Coburn Co. of Beaumont v. Nicholas (In re Nicholas), 956 F.2d 110,
113 (5th Cir.1992); Boyle v. Abilene Lumber, Inc (In re Boyle), 819 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.
1987); Lively, 904 S.W.2d at 875-76; Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-945 (1988)) ("The law
interpreting section 162.031(b) does not require such an explicit level of proof tying particular
expenditures to the improvements at issue. Construction trust funds may be used for overhead and
other 'directly related' expenses."); Taylor Pipeline Constr., Inc. v. Directional Rd. Boring, Inc.,
438 F. Supp. 2d 696, 715 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Swor v. Bartley Tex. Builders Hardware Inc., (In re
Swor), 347 Fed. App'x 113, 117 (5th Cir. 2009) (trust funds may be spent on "general business
overhead") (citing Boyle, 819 F.2d at 592); Ratliff Ready-Mix, L.P. v. Pledger (In re Pledger),
Bankr. No. 11-61151-CAG, Adv. No. 12-6005-CAG, 2013 WL 796626, at *6 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
March 4, 2013), affd, 2015 WL 294829 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing Nicholas, 956 F.2d at 110; Swor,
347 Fed. App'x at 117).
Interestingly, the Texas Supreme Court issued an opinion recently that cited the general
affirmative defense rule, but did not mention overhead specifically, but rather only more "direct"
expenses:
[T]he Trust Fund Act provides an affirmative defense when the trust funds not paid to a
laborer or materialman were used to pay the trustee's "actual expenses directly related
to the construction or repair of the improvement." TEX. PROP. CODE § 162.031(b)
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There have been, however, a few instances of cases questioning the
allowance of general overhead to satisfy the defense. The earliest objection
was registered in 1997 by Bankruptcy Judge Leif Clark in In re Faulkner.'
20
In Faulkner, the alleged misapplication of trust funds occurred when the
contractor made payments to a couple of owners of its business, ostensibly
for commissions in lieu of salary; that is, "essentially for compensation to
the owners of the business."'12 1 Judge Clark actually concluded that no
misapplication occurred, but the primary basis of his decision was based on
an apparent lack of wrongful intent because of some timing issues.1
However, in dicta at the end of the opinion, Judge Clark went on to address
whether the payments would satisfy the affirmative defense under section
162.031(b). 23 After reiterating that "this statute is to be construed broadly
to effectuate the remedial purpose for which it was enacted, which was to
protect the presumably 'exposed' subcontractor or supplier,"'' 24 Judge Clark
discussed the actual language of section 162.031 (b):
We... note that in parsing the language of the statute
itself, the Texas Legislature used adjectives such as
"actual" and "direct," and tied those adjectives to the
"construction" or "repair" of the improvements in question,
strongly indicating that, while payments to other suppliers,
or to workers actually making the improvements, or to
subcontractors working on the job might be sheltered, more
"indirect" payments, such as overhead to the contractor in
question, or "profit" built into the job's price, would not so
qualify. Because the question is a close one, however, we
turn to legislative history before rendering a final decision.
(West 2014). Such expenses include payments to subcontractors for costs actually and
directly tied to the improvement.
Dealers Elec. Sup. v. Scoggins Const. Co., 292 S.W.3d 650, 659 (Tex. 2009) (citing Taylor
Pipeline Constr., 438 F. Supp. 2d at 716; Holladay, 60 S.W.3d at 248; Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No.
JM-945 (1988)). It does not appear, however, that general overhead was at issue in the facts of the
case.
12'213 B.R. 660 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
' Id at 668.
12 Id at 667.
"Id at 667-69.
141d. at 668.
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That history is tracked in Texas Attorney General Opinion
JM945.1
25
After initially casting doubt on the propriety of allowing general
overhead to satisfy the affirmative defense, Judge Clark cited the Attorney
General Opinion, and the legislative history relied on by the Opinion. 26 He
particularly emphasized Representative Parker's response to Representative
Robnett's question about overhead, highlighting the portion of Parker's
response which stated: "And 'but for' the construction would I need to
spend this money. And if it's related to construction, I think it's
exempted." 27 After reciting this exchange, Judge Clark further stated:
While the exchange is not as clear as we might desire on
the point now before the court, it seems at least to indicate
that expenses would have to be parsed into those directly
incurred for a specific job, although not necessarily
requiring there to be a direct physical effect on the
construction site---e.g., the cost of a part-time bookkeeper
to monitor the progress of a particular job site-and those
non-attributable expenses incurred whether the office was
working on one job or a hundred-e.g., the monthly
expense of a telephone. Only the former expense appears to
fall within the exception to misapplication of trust funds
established by § 162.031(b). This interpretation is
supported by the Attorney General's concluding paragraph:
the words of section 162.031, "actual expenses
directly related to the construction or repair of the
improvement," include overhead and other
expenses which, though not readily traceable to a
particular job, are necessary to obtaining or
completing the job, so long as the expenses are
"actual," i.e., have in fact been incurred. 28
Judge Clark thus concluded that, if the issue were before the court, he
would hold that the general commissions paid to the contractor's owners
from trust funds would not be sufficient under the affirmative defense, as he
125Id. at 668 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
1261d.
127 1d. (emphasis in original) (citing Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988)).
128Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (citing Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988)).
20151
BA YLOR LA WREVIEW
rejected the interpretation of section 162.031(b) (contrary to Nicholas,
Lively, and the common interpretation of Op. No. JM-945) as allowing such
"indirect" or "general" overhead or other non-attributable expenses. 29 In
conclusion on this point, Judge Clark noted:
Were we, in fact, to read chapter 162 as the defendant
suggests, there would be very little of a contractor's
expenses that would not be sheltered by § 162.03 1(b). The
exception would quickly swallow the rule. All the money
spent by a debtor in the construction business would
become expenses that fall into the exception created by §
162.031(b). We simply do not believe that the Texas
Legislature, in enacting § 162.031 ever intended to
eviscerate the Texas Construction Trust Fund statute in this
manner, and therefore reject the debtor's proffered
interpretation.13
0
Judge Clark's reasoning has been cited approvingly by at least one other
bankruptcy court opinion for the proposition that "[t]he affirmative defense
at Section 162.031(b) for 'actual expenses directly related to the
construction or repair of the improvement' is limited to costs actually and
directly tied to the improvement in question and does not include 'indirect'
expenses, such as overhead to the contractor in question, or 'profit' built
into the job's price.' Thus, Judge Clark's opinion in In re Faulkner stands
in opposition to the weight of other precedent following Op. JM-945, in
holding that general overhead should not be allowed to prove the
affirmative defense of section 162.031 (b).132
A 2013 bankruptcy court opinion, In re Pledger, brought the tension
between these two lines of cases into sharp focus. 133 Pledger involved yet
again a contractor who failed to pay a subcontractor with trust funds, 134 but
to prove he had satisfied the affirmative defense the contractor asserted that
129See id. at 668-69.
13
°Id. at 669.
131LVR Carpet Center, Inc. v. Coley (In re Coley), 354 B.R. 798, 800 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2006) (citing Faulkner, 213 B.R. 660 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997)).
132See Faulkner, 213 B.R. at 669.
133See generally Ratliff Ready-Mix, L.P. v. Pledger (In re Pledger), Bankr. No. 11-61151-
CAG, Adv. No. 12-6005-CAG, 2013 WL 796626 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013), aff'd, 2015 WL
294829 (5th Cir. 2015).
1341d. at *1.
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he had used the trust funds to pay his company's general overhead or
bills-specifically, "he used the funds to pay truck payments, telephone
bills, and payroll [and admitted that] he did not use those payments on
expenses related to [the particular] project, but spent them elsewhere in the
corporation.' '135 The bankruptcy court initially had ruled in favor of the
subcontractor that the trust funds had been misapplied (and the debt was
thereby nondischargeable in bankruptcy). 136 However, on motion for
rehearing, the court was presented with the Nicholas line of cases relying on
the Attorney General Op. No. JM-945, and specifically the recent Fifth
Circuit case following this line, In re Swor.' 37 Specifically, the court
acknowledged that Swor (like Nicholas and other cases before it) stated:
"Nor must these funds be spent only on the project for which they were
received-they may be spent on other projects or on expenses related to
general business overhead."' The Pledger court noted that the Swor
opinion "cited Boyle as providing the guiding principle that general
business overhead expenses were permissible under the Texas Construction
Trust Fund Statute."'139 Faced with clear Fifth Circuit precedent on the issue,
the bankruptcy court in Pledger granted the motion for reconsideration,
40
ruling that the contractor's expenditures were sufficient to prove the
affirmative defense under Swor, Boyle and other precedents.1 4' However,
before concluding his opinion, the judge made the following observation
about the precedent allowing general overhead to suffice:
This interpretation of the statute is troubling to the Court.
The Court shares the same concerns the bankruptcy court
shared in Faulkner. Under such a standard it becomes
difficult to determine what constitutes a violation of the
statute. Indeed, under this approach, the affirmative
defense appears to swallow the statute itself Further, it
allows general contractors to pick and choose who they pay
"Id. at *5.
1361d. at *2. In so doing, the court followed Faulkner and also an apparently unpublished
opinion out of the Western District of Texas, Aguado Stone v. Wissen, Cause No. A-07-CA-506-
LY (W.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2008). Id.
137Id. at *5 (citing Swor v. Bartley Tex. Builders Hardware Inc. (In re Swor), 347 F. App'x
113, 116 (5th Cir. 2009)).
138Id. (emphasis added) (citing Swor, 347 F. App'x 113, 116 (5th Cir. 2009)).
139Id.
140 Id. at *7.
141See id. at *6.
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prior to filing bankruptcy, going against the guiding
principle that bankruptcy allows and [sic] orderly
distribution of assets to creditors. 1
42
Therefore, the current state of the interpretation of section 162.031(b) is, at
best, "unclear" in the words of Pledger,143 and more realistically, appears
settled (however incorrectly) that general business overhead is ultimately
sufficient to prove entitlement to the affirmative defense and therefore to
avoid liability for misapplication of trust funds under Chapter 162.
III. CORRECTING THE MISSTEP: RESTORING THE PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE
BENEFICIARIES
The state of the case law interpretation of the section 162.031(b)
affirmative defense to allow a contractor to avoid liability for
misapplication of trust funds by simply spending the money on its general
overhead is a failure of the policy which should have been implemented by
the original promulgation of the Trust Fund Act, and certainly by the 1987
amendments. There are three means of illustrating this failure and the errant
nature of such result: (1) the plain meaning of the statutory provision itself;
(2) a more comprehensive view of the legislative history of the 1987
amendments which casts a shadow on the influential 1988 Attorney General
opinion which shaped the current case law interpretation; and (3) the policy
concerns that the statute is supposed to embody.
A. The Plain Meaning of Section 162.031(b)
A standard canon of statutory construction is that the court should begin
with the plain language of the provision at issue.' 44 The plain language of
Chapter 162 provides that the money received by the general contractor is
considered "trust funds."'' 45 His receipt of the money renders him a
141Id. at *7 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The court noted, in fact, that "[s]uch [was]
the case here. Defendant chose not to pay Plaintiff for the concrete provided because Plaintiff was
'the big dog' who, in Defendants' judgment, could afford to carry the loss." Id. n.1.
143Id. at *5.
14467 TEX. JUR. 3D Statutes § 90 (2012) (citing Hernandez v. Ebrom, 289 S.W.3d 316 (Tex.
2009); United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Brite, 215 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2007); Hines v. State, 75
S.W.3d 444 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)).
'sTEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 162.001 (West 2014).
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"trustee"146 of the funds for the benefit of his "beneficiaries"-the artisans,
laborers, mechanics, contractors, subcontractors or materialmen who
furnish labor and supplies on the project. 147 The statute further provides that
"a trustee who, intentionally or knowingly or with intent to defraud, directly
or indirectly retains, uses, disburses, or otherwise diverts trust funds without
first fully paying all current or past due obligations incurred by the trustee
to the beneficiaries of the trust funds, has misapplied the trust funds.' 4 8
The concept of a "trust" has a very distinct, clearly known meaning.
According to Black's Law Dictionary a "trust" is "the right... to the
beneficial enjoyment of property to which another person holds the legal
title; a property interest held by one person (the trustee) at the request of
another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary)." 149
Here, in the trust comparison, the party paying the money (typically the
owner contracting for the improvement) would be in the position of the
settlor or grantor, entrusting the money to the contractor as trustee, 150 for
the express purpose in part to be sure that the ultimate beneficiaries-the
laborers and subcontractors hired by the contractor to carry out the work-
enjoy the benefit of the funds (i.e., are paid for their work). 1 ' To state it
more simply, the contractor/trustee is supposed to be sure the
subcontractors get paid from the money before he does anything else with
it.'52 If the contractor does not, he has misapplied the funds and violated the
trust.153 The plain meaning of the prima facie provision thus prohibits the
contractor from violating the trust by using the money (with the wrongful
intent) for any reason-whether otherwise legitimate business expenses or
the costs of an impromptu vacation to Tahiti-before the beneficiaries are
first paid. A trustee is after all, a fiduciary that owes the highest duty to his
beneficiaries.1
5 4
1
4 6
1d. § 162.002.
1
471d. § 162.003.
148 Id. § 162.03 1(a) (emphasis added).
149BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1740 (10th ed. 2014).
150 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.002.
151 d. § 162.003.
152 See id. § 162.031(a).
1
5 3
1d
154 See Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) ("Many forms of
conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.
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The first affirmative defense of section 162.031(b) provides a safe
harbor for the contractor/trustee.' 55 It provides that "[i]t is an affirmative
defense to prosecution or other action brought under Subsection (a) that the
trust funds not paid to the beneficiaries of the trust were used by the trustee
to pay the trustee's actual expenses directly related to the construction or
repair of the improvement."'' 56 Thus, the expenses must be "actual"-
obviously actually incurred in fact-and they must further be directly
related to the project. 57 "Directly," or the root form "direct," in this sense
means "stemming immediately from a source; or, characterized by close
logical, causal, or consequential relationship."' 58 Further, the word "related"
means "connected by reason of an established or discoverable relation."' 5 9
The plain meaning of this provision would exclude any expenses which are
not directly related-i.e., no relation or only an indirect relation to the
project. 160 Therefore, expenses which have no relation would obviously
include clearly inappropriate expenses such as gambling debts or vacation
costs to Tahiti.16' These would have no relation to any project, and thus
would clearly not be sufficient under the section 162.031(b) affirmative
defense.
162
But the same problem exists under the affirmative defense with
indirectly related expenses. And the problem with "overhead" is that by its
very definition it is generally conceived of as indirect expenses.
63
Overhead is defined as "business expenses (such as rent, utilities, or
support-staff salaries) that cannot be allocated [i.e., are not "directly
related"] to a particular product or service; fixed or ordinary operating
costs."'164 "Also termed administrative expense; office expense.' ' 65 This
comports with the definition used by at least one Texas court: "As generally
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior.").
155TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.031(b).
6 1d. (emphasis added).
157id.
15'MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 353 (1 1th ed. 2006).
'
591d. at 1050.
160See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.03 1(b).
161 See id.
162id.
163 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (10th ed. 2014).
164id
165Id. (emphasis added).
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understood in the field of accounting, overhead broadly includes the
continuous expenses of a business, without regard to the outlay on a
particular contract."'166 To take monthly rent as an example, say that a
contractor has office rent for $2,000/per month. If he has Job A in January,
the monthly rent is simply not directly related. It may be true that the
contractor cannot adequately run a business without sufficient office space,
but the fact remains that the contractor had the overhead rent expense
before Job A, he has it during Job A, and he will continue to have it after
Job A. Overhead is not directly related to any one construction project.167
Or, as Judge Clark put it in Faulkner, overhead is "expenses incurred
whether the office was working on one job or a hundred"' 68-again, it is
simply not directly related to any one project. 169 It is also exceedingly
noteworthy that the legislature knew how to use the term overhead and
specify it expressly-indeed it had done so in the previous version of the
statute. 70 But the term is absent in the current version of the statute and
accordingly, the plain meaning of the provision excludes typical
overhead.17' To conclude that "overhead" (i.e., indirect expenses by
definition) is allowed in a provision that calls for "actual expenses directly
related," is arguably an absurd result--one which courts are supposed to
avoid in the interpretation of statutes. 172 The plain meaning suggests
otherwise-that overhead does not qualify.
166N. Tex. Operating Eng'rs Health Benefit Fund v. Dixie Masonry, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 516,
519 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (emphasis added).
167See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1278 (10th ed. 2014).
168Airtron, Inc. v. Faulkner (In re Faulkner), 213 B.R. 660, 668 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
169See id.
170 Act of June 18, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 578, § 4, sec. 162.031, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws
2283, 2283-84 (amended 1987) (current version at TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.031 (West
2014) (cited in Boyle v. Abilene Lumber, Inc. (In re Boyle), 819 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1987)).
71 See TEX PROP CODE ANN. § 162.031.
17267 TEx. JUR. 3D Statutes § 124 (2012) (citations omitted) ("The court will never adopt a
construction that will make a statute absurd or one that will lead to absurd conclusions or
consequences if the language of the enactment is susceptible of any other meaning. Application of
any rule of construction will not be made that, in the circumstances, will lead to absurdity. The
reason for the rule is that the legislature is not to be credited with doing or intending a foolish
thing6 or with requiring a futile, impossible, or useless thing to be done.").
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B. An Expanded Look at the Legislative History and Intent of the
1987 Amendments and the Probable Error of Attorney General
Opinion JM-945
The current case law interpretation of section 162.031(b) as allowing
general overhead to suffice has its genesis in a series of cases beginning
with In re Nicholas, which, in turn, was largely based on the 1988 Attorney
General Opinion JM-945.173 Recall that Opinion JM-945 was the response
to an inquiry from Senator John Montford about the appropriate
interpretation of House Bill 1160 in the 70th Legislature in 1987,174 and one
of the questions specifically asked about the propriety of including
essentially general overhead as allowable expenses to satisfy the affirmative
defense. 175 The Attorney General answered affirmatively, and thereby
provided the basis for the current line of cases holding the same.17 6 In the
opinion, the Attorney General not only cited and relied on a pre-1987 case,
Dixie Masonry (which had been decided when the statute expressly
specified overhead), 77 it also relied on some excerpts from the legislative
debate of House Bill 1160.178
The Attorney General was well-advised to consider the legislative
debates and history concerning House 1160, of course:
When the meaning of a statute is in doubt, reference may
be made to legislative journals and records in order to
ascertain the history of the passage of the act, to clarify it,
or to disclose the intention of the legislature. Executive
messages to the legislative body, debates, and committee
reports may be considered.
179
But the Opinion cited only two isolated excerpts, concluding that they
supported the conclusion that the affirmative defense allowed general
173 See supra Parts II.B & C.
174 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988).
175 1d. ("Do 'expenses directly related to the construction or repair of the improvement' under
Section 162.031(b), Property Code, include the trustee's overhead and other expenses which,
though not readily traceable to a particular job are necessary to obtaining or completing the job
(e.g., office rent, employee salaries, workers' compensation insurance, liability insurance,
communications bill, etc.)?").
1761d.
1771d.
178id 
.179 67 TEX. JUR. 3D Statutes § 147 (2012) (citations omnitted).
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overhead within its safe harbor.180 A more complete look at the history not
cited by the Opinion, however, reveals that the weight and balance of the
debate actually weighs against the conclusion that general overhead was
contemplated as sufficient for the affirmative defense. And, if this is true,
then the very Opinion which provided the foundation for the current case
law interpretation of the statute is suspect, which of course renders the
entire line of cases suspect as well.
The first exchange cited and relied upon by the Opinion is as follows:
Representative Robnett:
Do you intend that it is o.k. for a builder to pay his
superintendent, secretary, computer, pickup truck, office or
any administrative expenses and other similar expenses
related to the construction of a home out of these trust
funds?
Representative Parker:
I think, yes, I certainly do and I [want to] direct your
attention, Buzz I think it's important to that 'directly
related' now. I think there has to be a maybe you might
need to ask a 'but for' question. And 'but for' the
construction would I need to spend this money. And if it's
related to construction, I think it's exempted. I do not think
it presents a problem. 181
This exchange has been quoted accurately by the AG Opinion. 182 When
listening to the actual audio recording, however, it would appear that Parker
was hesitant when he began ("I think, yes.. ."), and then made an attempt to
clarify with the "directly related" and "but for" discussion. 183 And, in fact,
his answer is internally inconsistent when matched with Robnett's
question-a computer or office expense clearly does not satisfy Parker's
"but for" test, as discussed previously with the nature of overhead.184 And
thus, as Judge Leif Clark mentioned in Faulkner, "the exchange is not as
18
°Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988).
'
81ld. (citing Debate on Tex. H.B. 1160 on the Floor of the House, 70th Leg., R.S. (May 30,
1967) (tapes available at Reference/Documents of the Texas State Library and Archives
Commission).
182Debate on Tex. H.B. 1160 on the Floor of the House, 70th Leg., R.S. (May 30, 1967)
(tapes available at Reference/Documents of the Texas State Library and Archives Commission).
183 Id. (statement of Representative Robnett).
184See supra notes 164-172 and accompanying text.
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clear as we might desire on the point ... ,, It could just as easily be
construed, in its totality, as against the propriety of general overhead as for
it (though admittedly if so Parker was inconsistent in his response).
Moreover, when the entirety of the course of legislative debate on
House Bill 1160 is observed, what becomes clear is that, in fact, most of the
parties seemed to understand that the bill was removing the former language
allowing overhead, which had the effect of substantively removing
overhead as an allowed expense for purposes of the affirmative defense. 18 6
The first discussion of House Bill 1160 on record occurred on April 1,
1987, in the House Judicial Affairs Committee.1 87 At that meeting,
Representative Parker laid out the bill, and then two groups testified in
favor of the bill, and one group (representing primarily general contractors)
testified against it. 188 Robert Bass, testifying in favor of the bill (on behalf
of a group of lumber suppliers), noted that the bill "eliminates the
'reasonable overhead' exception to prosecution."'' 89  Jim Sewell,
representing a large contractors association and testifying in opposition to
the bill, was not specific in his testimony but merely said that "there are
many.., points in this that we feel would do a great deal of harm to a large
construction project.,' 9 ° Finally, Parker concluded the meeting on April 1
by stating that he was not only looking out for the interests of
subcontractors who did not get paid out of trust funds, but also for the
interests of homeowners who might be called upon to "pay twice" if the
trust funds were misapplied (i.e., pay the general contractor, and then be
forced to pay the subcontractor who remained unpaid or face liens on his
house when the contractor used the trust funds for other purposes).' 9'
lS5Airtron, Inc. v. Faulkner (In re Faulkner), 213 B.R. 660, 668 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997)
(referring to discussion cited in Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988)).
186 See infra this section.
187 See Tex. H. Judicial Affairs Comm. Minutes 4, 70th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 1, 1987).
1881d. The two people testifying in favor of the bill were Robert Bass (representing
Lumbermen's Association of Texas) and Dick Hargis (representing the Texas Rental Association).
The person testifying against the bill was Jim Sewell (representing Associated General
Contractors-Texas Building Branch).
189Meeting on Tex. H.B. 1160 in Tex. H. Judicial Affairs Comm., 70th Leg., R.S. (Apr. 1,
1987) (Tape 2, Side 1) (emphasis added).
19°d.
1911Id.
[Vol. 67:1
TEXAS CONSTRUCTION TRUST FUND ACT
The next record discussion on House Bill 1160 occurred on May 19,
1987, in the Senate Criminal Justice Committee. 192 Senator Parker laid out
the bill, and Bass again testified in favor of the bill on behalf of the lumber
suppliers. This time, two contractors' groups testified against the bill-
Texas Association of Builders (represented by Lyle Johansen) and
Associated General Contractors-Texas Building Branch (represented by
Howard Rose). 193 This is the meeting from which the AG Opinion derived
its second excerpt as follows:
Mr. Johansen [Executive Vice President of Texas
Association of Builders]:
[W]hen you have a multiplicity of loans and a multiplicity
of houses under construction it's almost impossible to track
that money through and to prove that X draw was paid on
X house when you have other ongoing expenses and
overhead items that you need to pay.
Senator Parker:
[Builders got in trouble under the old law] because they
refused to keep decent records ... what is so difficult about
[it]. It ought not to be that hard to figure out some
proportion of your overhead total overhead-total overhead
that goes to per day, per month, per man hour worked.
194
The Attorney General cited this exchange as part of his support for the
conclusion that the legislative intent of House Bill 1160 was clearly to
allow for the payment of general overhead expenses to satisfy the
affirmative defense codified at section 162.031 (b).'95
192 Tex. S. Criminal Justice Comm. Minutes, 70th Leg., R.S. (May 19, 1987).
193 Meeting on Tex. H.B. 1160 in Tex. S. Criminal Justice Comm., 70th Leg., R.S. (May 19,
1987) (Tapes 2 and 3). The minutes additionally reflect the following persons who were present in
support of the bill but provided no testimony: H.R. Daniel Guerra of Great Houston Lumber and
Building Materials Dealers Association; Billy Crawford and George D. Jones of Foxworth-
Galbraith Lumber Company; Tom Hanover Building Materials, Round Rock; A. George Natsis of
Edna Lumber Company; Robert C. Sneed of Texas Land Title Association; and Dick Hargis of
Texas Rental Association. Tex. S. Criminal Justice Comm. Minutes, 70th Leg., R.S. (May 19,
1987).
194 Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988) (citing Meeting on Tex. H.B. 1160 in Tex. S.
Criminal Justice Comm., 70th Leg., R.S. (May 19, 1987)).
1951Id
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However, a more careful and revealing look into the dialogue that
occurred in the Committee meeting on May 19 reveals a much different
picture. After Senator Parker laid out the bill, Bass again testified in favor
of it, and stated that "it eliminates the reasonable overhead exception and in
its place gives an affirmative defense . . . to a contractor ... [where] he can
apply the funds to his actual expenses directly related to the project .... ,196
Bass further noted that when the contractor does not do this and pay the
subcontractors, "[e]veryone is harmed, everyone is damaged when it's not
done."' 97 Then, Johansen began testifying in opposition to the bill in his
status as Vice President of the Texas Association of Builders:
Mr. Johansen [Executive Vice President of Texas
Association of Builders]:
We oppose House Bill 1160 for the following reasons ....
the bill prohibits the builder from using the loan funds to
pay reasonable overhead Overhead expenses that he has
that are directly in proportion to his business. Under the bill
a knowing use of the trust funds to pay overhead expenses
would become a misapplication for which the builder
would be subjected to criminal penalties without the intent
to defraud. Overhead items might include such gray areas
as architectural costs, company trucks, superintendents-
Chairman:
Lyle, let me ask a question because as I read the bill it's an
affirmative defense to prosecution for other action under
the proposal if the trust funds were used to pay the direct
overhead costs of the project contractor. Am I-have I
misread it?
Johansen:
It says actual expenses directly related- my copy. Perhaps
I have a wrong copy of the legislation-
Chairman:
No, actual expenses directly related.
196Meeting on Tex. H.B. 1160 in Tex. S. Criminal Justice Comm., 71st Leg., R.S. (May 19,
1987) (Audio Tapes 2 and 3 available from Texas State Library and Archives Commission)
(emphasis added).
19 7 id
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Johansen:
Well you could have indirect costs such as accounting fees,
how about insurance, workers' comp insurance. That's an
indirect cost.... You have other gray areas where you have
legitimate examples of where a bill came due that is
directly related to the business and those bills are paid with
the draw-with a draw-
Chairman:
Well, they're directly related to the project, expenses
directly related to the project.
Johnansen:
Not all of it would be. If you had your workers' comp
premium come up you couldn't directly tie all of that
premium to the draw.... 9
8
As this exchange shows, there is no question what Johansen-a
sophisticated officer of a powerful Texas contractors association-thought
the revised statutory language of House Bill 1160 meant. He interpreted the
"actual expenses directly related" language to unequivocally eliminate
overhead as an allowable expense for the affirmative defense. 199 Moreover,
the legislators did not appear to meaningfully disagree or challenge
Johansen regarding his conclusion.
And Johansen was not alone in his interpretation that day. Later in the
hearing, Howard Rose testified in his capacity as the attorney for the Texas
Building Division of the Associated General Contractors. 200 This exchange
occurred:
Chairman:
Howard, all he [the contractor] has to do is pay his bills. If
he pays his bills ....
Howard Rose [attorney for Texas Building Division-
Associated General Contractors]:
Well, I can read the bill, and the bill says that it is an
affirmative defense and I read that to mean that the
contractor has to come in and prove that that money went
198 1d. (emphasis added).
199 See id.
200 Id.
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into the job and if he doesn't prove that then he's guilty of
a crime .... if [the contractor] goes to paying the President
or the home office expense [i.e., overhead] he's got a real
problem.... 201
Rose, like Johansen, clearly interpreted the affirmative language to exclude
use of the trust funds to pay general overhead expenses, and again, the
legislators did not meaningfully disagree with Rose's opinion, but rather
spent the bulk of the time in trying to persuade him of the merits of the bill.
The next instance of a record of legislative debate on House Bill 1160
came on the floor of the Senate on May 25, 1987. This exchange occurred
between Senators Anderson and Parker:
Anderson:
Senator, as I understand it, a part of the bone of contention
between the two factions concerned a treatment of
overhead whether it was directly or indirectly related.
Parker:
Yes.
Anderson:
Could you explain how your, your Floor Amendment takes
care of that?
Parker:
Well, the, the amendment or the portion of the substitute
that I intend to offer that takes care of that, it gives you an
absolute defense if after you've notified that a complaint
has been filed, if you then-you have 30 days then to go
pay those bills and that is a complete defense without
regard to where it went.
Anderson:
I see. And the, as you understand it, the, your Floor
substitute takes the-if you will the-
20 1Id. (emphasis added)
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Parker:
Takes away the objection that the home builders had, yes
sir. They've signed off on this. They worked with the ah-
the suppliers and lumbermen on this particular language.20 2
This exchange corroborates that the overhead issue was a "bone of
contention" between the builders and the likely suppliers and
subcontractors, as already demonstrated by the previous exchanges that had
occurred in committee hearings. Interestingly, Senator Parker responds that
this issue had been resolved-not by any change to the "actual expenses
directly related" affirmative defense of section 162.031(b), but by a
different "fail safe" affirmative defense provision contained, apparently, in
what became section 162.031 (c) which is not related to the characterization
of the expenses paid but rather provides the contractor an escape path if he
pays all beneficiaries in full within 30 days of being sent notice of a
criminal complaint.20 3 It also clearly shows that the builders/contractors
were not happy with the language of section 162.031(b), which apparently
remained interpreted as eliminating their ability to pay overhead and avail
themselves of the "actual expenses directly related" affirmative defense.
Later in the Senate Floor debate on May 25 Senator Tejada and Senator
Parker had this clarifying exchange:
Tejada:
Senator, just by way of trying to determine your intent on
this substitute. Does the definition in the substitute of
current and past due obligations mean that a contractor who
receives a construction loan draw must pay out ah--only
those bills which the work was done at the time? And once
those are, those obligations are taken care of then it can be
moved over and paid for the, the overhead, the other
overhead?
202Debate on Tex. H.B. 1160 on the Floor of the Senate 70th Leg., R.S. (May 25, 1987).
203 See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.03 1(c) (West 2014). ("It is also an affirmative defense
to prosecution or other action brought under Subsection (a) that the trustee paid the beneficiaries
all trust funds which they are entitled to receive no later than 30 days following written notice to
the trustee of the filing of a criminal complaint or other notice of a pending criminal
investigation.").
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Parker:
That's exactly the intent."'
This dialogue also confirms that the intent of the bill was to not allow
payment of overhead to avoid liability, when money was still owed to
beneficiaries-subcontractors or other laborers with whom the general
contractor had contracted. The beneficiaries are supposed to be paid first.
The final point at which a record of legislative debate exists regarding
House Bill 1160 is the final House Floor debate which occurred on May 30,
1987, just as the legislative session was drawing to a close. This is the
debate from which the Attorney General drew the previously discussed
exchange between Representatives Robnett and Parker. 20 5 After the Robnett
question and answer, Representative Heflin asked some questions of
Representative Parker, resulting in part in this exchange:
Heflin:
Uh, do you assume that he [the general contractor building
a house] has included in the cost a profit for doing business,
a profit for his part of the work?
Parker:
I think you have to assume that, yes.
Heflin:
Ok. Then, would it hamper him, or preclude him, from
taking that portion that would be deemed as a profit and
covering other incidental expenses that might not
necessarily be related to your project? Would it, in that
sense, restrict that kind of activity?
Parker:
.... I assume if you pay your current or past due
obligations, then I assume that, that you, if the rest of it is
profit I assume you can use that.2"6
Just as the Senate exchange between Senators Parker and Tejada had done
previously on May 25, this exchange also on May 30 in the House confirms
2°4Debate on Tex. H.B. 1160 on the Floor of the Senate, 70th Leg., R.S. (May 25, 1987)
(emphasis added).
205See Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-945 (1988) (citing Debate on Tex. H.B. 1160 on the Floor
of the House, 70th Leg., R.S. (May 30, 1987)).
206 Debate on Tex. H.B. 1160 on the Floor of the House, 70th Leg., R.S. (May 30, 1987).
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that the intent of the bill was to not allow payment of overhead to avoid
liability, when money was still owed to beneficiaries, but rather only once
such obligations had been paid current. (Tellingly, after the formal
discussion on the bill was ended, the tape apparently kept rolling as the
members began to depart, and you can clearly hear a discussion where one
of the legislators is talking to someone about the hostility toward the bill,
stating: " . . well, we had a bunch of builders out there having a
fit .... ).207
The legislative excerpts discussed above give a much fuller picture than
did the two isolated excerpts contained in Attorney General Opinion No.
JM-945. Although the Opinion characterized the legislative debate as
supportive of the bill's interpretation as allowing general overhead to
suffice for proof of the affirmative defense, in actuality the weight of the
legislative debate suggests the opposite-that the bill, consonant with the
plain meaning, was interpreted by nearly all of the discussing parties as
eliminating the prior allowance of overhead in proof of satisfaction of the
affirmative defense.20 8 The debate shows (and the builders were clearly
unhappy with) the interpretation that the bill disallowed payment of
overhead expenses until all obligations owed to beneficiaries had been
satisfied.20 9 As such, the conclusion of the Attorney General in Op. JM-945
is deeply flawed in this matter, which also casts a great shadow on the prior
cases relying on the AG Opinion for this proposition.210
C. Overhead Expenditures from Trust Funds Contravene the Policies
of the Trust Fund Statute
The final argument against allowing contractors to avoid liability by
using trust funds on their general overhead is that it contravenes the very
policies that the Trust Fund Statute is designed to advance. The statute was
obviously designed to protect materialmen, laborers and subcontractors,
who rely on being paid from funds given to the general contractor by the
owner or other source. 211 The law was designed to supplement and
2 0 7 
id.
208 id.
2 0 9
1d
2 10See supra Parts II.B & C.
2 11See STERLING W. STEVES & BRENDA T. CUBBAGE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO
MECHANIC'S AND MATERIALMAN'S LIEN LAWS OF TEXAS § 6.01 (4th ed. 2000) (citing Direct
Value, LLC v. Stock Bldg. Supply, LLC, 388 S.W.3d 386, 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2012, no
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complement the mechanic's lien remedy that such laborers also can utilize
as a last resort.21 2 However, these procedures are time-consuming, laborious
and uncertain-making sure the subcontractors and laborers are paid in the
first place is obviously a much more desirable result.
The purpose of the trust fund statute is to be sure these laborers are paid
first from trust funds received. Section 162.031(a) expressly provides that
the contractor/trustee in receipt of trust funds misapplies those funds when
he "intentionally or knowingly or with intent to defraud, directly or
indirectly retains, uses, disburses, or otherwise diverts trust funds without
first fully paying all current or past due obligations incurred by the trustee
to the beneficiaries of the trust funds., 213 The beneficiaries are intended to
be paid first - before the contractor pays any other bills--ensuring that their
obligations are satisfied.214 To allow the contractor/trustee to instead use the
trust funds to pay its own bills, such as its general overhead, obviously is
diametrically opposed to the underlying policy goal of the statute in seeing
that the beneficiaries are paid first. And it is contrary to the notion of the
contractor as a "trustee," as set forth in the statute.21 5 It is axiomatic that a
trustee is, as a general matter, not supposed to engage in self-dealing but
rather must act in the utmost fiduciary manner toward his beneficiaries.216
To construe the section 162.031(b) affirmative defense so as to simply
allow a contractor to pay all of his general overhead and operating expenses
from the trust funds, simply eviscerates the underlying policy that the
statute sought to implement. Judge Clark's admonition in Faulkner here
bears repeating:
Were we, in fact, to read chapter 162 as the defendant
suggests, there would be very little of a contractor's
expenses that would not be sheltered by § 162.03 1(b). The
exception would quickly swallow the rule. All the money
pet.); McCoy v. Nelson Utils. Servs., Inc., 736 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1987,
writ refd n.r.e.); Am. Amicable Life Ins. Co. v. Jay's Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc., 535
S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
212 See id. (citing Owens v. Drywall & Acoustical Supply Corp., 325 F. Supp. 397, 400 (S.D.
Tex. 1971)). The mechanic's lien statutes are in Chapter 53 of the Texas Property Code.
213 TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.031 (a) (West 2014) (emphasis added).
214 See id.
"'Id. § 162.002 ("A contractor, subcontractor, or owner or an officer, director, or agent of a
contractor, subcontractor, or owner, who receives trust funds or who has control or direction of
trust funds, is a trustee of the trust funds.").
216 See 72 TEX. JUR. 3D Trusts § 68 (2013).
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spent by a debtor in the construction business would
become expenses that fall into the exception created by
§ 162.031(b). We simply do not believe that the Texas
Legislature, in enacting § 162.031 ever intended to
eviscerate the Texas Construction Trust Fund statute in this
manner, and therefore reject the debtor's proffered
interpretation.217
And, as the judge in Pledger added recently with regard to allowing
overhead expenses for the defense: "Indeed, under this approach, the
affirmative defense appears to swallow the statute itself.,
218
There is, however, an additional, related, reason that allowing overhead
contravenes the policy objectives of the Trust Fund Act-the "pay twice"
problem faced by the owners. The primary policy objective of the statute, as
discussed, is to ensure that the beneficiaries-the subcontractors, laborers
and materialmen hired by the general contractor to perform the work-are
paid from the trust funds. However, there is another party who is directly
impacted if the beneficiaries are not paid from the trust funds-the owner.
If the subcontractors are not paid by their contractor/trustee who hired them,
the subcontractors will still be entitled to seek relief and payment from the
ultimate owners-this will be under various theories, including assertion of
mechanic's liens219 or other theories such as quantum meruit.220 That is, the
owners will have to "pay twice.",221 The first time they pay is to the general
217 Airtron, Inc. v. Faulker (In re Faulkner), 213 B.R. 660, 669 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997).
2 18Ratliff Ready-Mix L.P. v. Pledger (In re Pledger), Bankr. No. 11-61151-CAG, Adv. No.
12-6005-CAG, 2013 WL 796626, at *7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2013), aff'd, 2015 WL 294829 (5th
Cir. 2015).
219 See generally Thx. PROP. CODE. ANN. §§ 53.001-.287 (West 2011 & Supp. 2014).
220See STEVES AND CUBBAGE, supra note 211, § 1.03.
221Meeting on Tex. H.B. 1160 in Tex. S. Criminal Justice Comm., 71st Leg., R.S. (May 19,
1987) (Audio Tapes 2 and 3 available from Texas State Library and Archives Commission). When
introducing House Bill 1160 in the meeting on May 19, 1987, Senator Parker stated:
We continue to run into problems, however, with civil and criminal enforcement of
those who particularly in tough times get to robbing Peter to pay Paul and home owners
or people who contract for construction of various things end up having to pay for their
construction twice. They pay for it and then discover that either some of their funds
have been misapplied. The subcontractors don't get paid or they get halfway through it
and even though they've paid in advance for a substantial part of the construction the
funds are gone.
Id. (emphasis added).
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contractor with whom they have privity (and to which funds are given in
trust in part to pay whatever subcontractors are in turn hired). The second
time, though, the owner may be called upon to pay is when the
subcontractors are not paid, the trust is breached, and the subcontractors
assert rights against the owner directly.2 22 This is also the harm targeted by
the Trust Funds Act.223 And, unlike allowing an affirmative defense for
"actual expenses directly related" to the owner's construction project or
improvement, allowing the contractor/trustee to use trust funds to pay
general overhead does nothing to avoid the "double payment" problem
facing the owner. As Robert Bass said in testifying for House Bill 1160 in
1987: "[e]veryone is harmed, everyone is damaged when it's not done''224 _
including the owner. As such, the underlying policy goals of the Trust Fund
Act are thereby frustrated when overhead is allowed to suffice under the
section 162.03 1(b) affirmative defense.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Trust Fund Act's purpose is to ensure that subcontractors and
laborers hired by a general contractor are paid from the funds paid to the
contractor by the owner-this is the overriding objective. 225 As initially
2221d.; see also Meeting on Tex. H.B. 1160 in Tex. H. Judicial Affairs Comm., 71st Leg., R.S.
(April 1, 1987) (Audio Tape 2, Side 1 available from Texas State Library and Archives
Commission). Rep. Parker stated, in closing the discussion of House Bill 1160:
I think Mr. Bass is probably looking at this more from the standpoint of subcontractors,
things of that nature. I'm looking at it from the standpoint of homeowners. So that they,
too, do not get into the position of borrowing money to add on or construct, or whatever
a home, in good faith. The contractor takes the money, and instead of spending the
money on that home he diverts that money to some other project. And then whenever
it's, uh, the dust settles and smoke clears, well, there's always people out there that still
haven't been paid.
Id. (emphasis added).
223in most residential construction cases, in fact, the Trust Fund Act states specifically that
homeowners are also express beneficiaries of the trust funds, because of this double payment
problem. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.003(b) (West 2014). ("A property owner is a beneficiary
of trust funds described by Section 162.001 in connection with a residential construction contract,
including funds deposited into a construction account described by Section 162.006.").
224Meeting on Tex. H.B. 1160 in Tex. S. Criminal Justice Comm., 71st Leg., R.S. (May 19,
1987) (Audio Tapes 2 and 3 available from Texas State Library and Archives Commission).
225Act of May 27, 1967, 60th Leg., R.S., ch. 323, 1960 Tex. Gen. Laws 770 (West); Direct
Value, L.L.C. v. Stock Bldg. Supply, L.L.C., 388 S.W.3d 386, 391 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2012,
no pet.).
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introduced in 1967, there were no exceptions to the requirement to first pay
such beneficiaries from the trust funds.22 6 Through inartful compromise, the
final version of the statute passed in 1967 did allow an awkwardly worded
"overhead" exception, albeit with the dissonant proviso that such overhead
be directly related to the project.227 However, after problems with the statute
in that form emerged in the cases, the Act was revised in 1987 to
completely eliminate the reference to allowing overhead expenses-instead
providing it was an affirmative defense if the contractor utilized the trust
funds for "actual expenses directly related" to the construction or project at
issue.228 At first glance, the change appeared obviously to change the statute
so that liability could not be avoided by spending the trust funds on the
contractor's general overhead. However, because of Attorney General
Opinion No. JM-945, which interpreted the statute to continue to allow
general overhead under the defense, several federal and state cases relied on
the Opinion and held overhead was allowed.229
This is a bad policy outcome. It is based on a misreading of the statute,
and it should be remedied. The Attorney General's opinion was based on a
dubious reading of the legislative history and debate on House Bill 1160,
and in fact it is much more likely that all legislators and parties involved
took the meaning of the new affirmative defense to be exactly what a plain
reading would indicate-that while formerly overhead in some fashion was
arguably allowed under the pre-1987 version of the statute, it was being
clearly eliminated and replaced with a provision requiring expenditures to
be of "actual expenses directly related" to the construction-something that
is completely at odds with the traditional definition of "overhead. 2 30 How
or why the Attorney General came to the opposite conclusion is mere
speculation, although there was no question that the lobbying and pressure
against such an outcome on the part of the various builders associations was
transparent and intense. 23 1 This calls into question the entire line of cases
allowing overhead under section 162.031(b), since they were all based on
the 1988 Attorney General opinion which almost certainly misread the
legislative intent and plain meaning of House Bill 1160.
226 See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
227 See supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
228See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
229 See supra notes 92-143 and accompanying text.
23 0See supra Parts I1I.A & B.
23 1See supra Part III.B.
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The way forward would be for the appropriate courts to disagree with,
or overrule as appropriate, the case law allowing overhead. On the federal
side, this would appear to require that the Fifth Circuit-in an appropriate
case-simply overrule its prior holdings in the Nicholas, Boyle, and the
Swor cases, and hold instead that overhead is no longer sufficient to prove
entitlement to the section 162.03 1(b) affirmative defense. On the state side,
the various courts of appeal could overrule prior holdings, or decide for the
first time that overhead is not sufficient. Given that the Texas Supreme
Court does not appear to have squarely ruled on the issue, a holding on their
part would also fully resolve the issue since they are not bound by the prior
Erie holdings of the 5th Circuit or other federal courts.232
Alternatively, the Texas Legislature could resolve the issue by careful
and explicit legislative amendment. The current Texas statute does, in its
current and properly interpreted form, obviously leave room for the
possibility that the contractor/trustee can use the trust funds to possibly pay
someone (including possibly the contractor itself) other than the express
beneficiaries, so long as the expenses are actually incurred and directly
related to the particular construction project.233 The legislature could greatly
simplify the matter by legislatively removing this possibility. For instance,
the Oklahoma counterpart to the Texas Trust Fund Act is different, in that it
does not contemplate payment to anyone other than beneficiaries until they
are paid.234 There is no exception-the contractor/trustee violates the
Oklahoma version of the Act if it does not pay the beneficiaries first.235 The
contractor may not pay its overhead, and may not pay other expenses-it
must satisfy the trust obligation to be sure that its beneficiaries are paid
before any other expenditures are allowed. Such a result would vindicate
the policy goals of the Texas Trust Fund Act in a much more
straightforward manner, and insure that the beneficiaries are paid for their
work.
These steps should be taken to reorient the typical players in Texas
construction projects, in order to give back to the subcontractors, laborers,
232See Kihega v. State, 392 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2013, no pet.).
233TEx, PROP. CODE ANN. § 162.031(b) (West 2014).
234See 42 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 153 (West 2014) ("The trust funds created under
Section 152 of this title shall be applied to the payment of said valid lienable claims and no
portion thereof shall be used for any other purpose until all lienable claims due and owing or to
become due and owing shall have been paid.") (cited in Coburn Co. v. Nicholas (In re Nicholas),
956 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1992)).
235 See id.
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materialmen and artisans the protection, which was the basis for the original
enactment of the Trust Fund Act in the first place. Subcontractors and other
beneficiaries need this protection, as they generally are smaller operatives
and often lack the bargaining power and sophistication of the larger builders
and general contractors.236 Many thus lack the resources and wherewithal to
pursue their remedies in the event the contractor does not pay them from the
trust funds. Rectifying the misstep in the development of the Trust Fund
Act and its interpretation will go a long way toward achieving justice and
fair, prompt compensation for the subcontractors, laborers and materialmen
who provide their services in the Lone Star State.
236 See Hemandez v. Big 4, Inc., 241 F. Supp. 2d 715, 720-21 (S.D. Tex. 2003) ("The Court
is well aware of the real world lack of bargaining power between subcontractors and general
contractors."); Gilson S. Riecken, The Duty to Defend Under Non-Insurance Indemnity
Agreements: Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc. and Its Troubling Consequences for
Design Professionals, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 825, 854 (2010) (noting "the disparate
bargaining power between most contractors and their subcontractors").
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